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Many observers of American politics have been highly critical of the proliferation of 
primaries that occurred in the 1970s. One of the reasons given for this unfavorable assessment 
is that the direct primary cannot consistently yield candidates who have broad electoral 
support-something that is thought necessary to win general elections. And since the major 
goal of parties is to win elections, this perceived shortcoming is cause for concern. 
In this article I show, however, that the problem lies not with the direct primary itself, 
but rather with the rules that govern presidential primaries. In fact, if parties would allocate 
delegates proportionally to candidates, adopt a preference ballot, and allow independents 
and "swing" voters to participate, the direct primary would offer an excellent opportunty 
to nominate candidates with broad support. 
O ne of the fundamental tenets of American politics is that political 
parties strive to win elections. From M. Ostrogorski's (1902) investigation 
of how American parties actually work to Anthony Down's (1957) analysis 
of how parties ought to behave, this belief has served as the anchor of 
much of the best discussion of party politics that we have. Yet many 
scholars claim that the replacement of a politician-dominated system of 
presidential nominations with one dominated by rank-and-file voters has 
weakened the capacity of the national parties to nominate candidates with 
broad electoral support-something that is generally thought necessary 
to win general elections. Perhaps for this reason, many of the most 
prominent scholars of political parties have been skeptical, if not openly 
hostile, to the new system of nominations, viewing them as antithetical 
to the fundamental purposes of parties (Ceasar, 1979, 1982; Polsby, 1983; 
Ranney, 1975). 
Few can doubt that direct primaries remove power from party 
professionals and give it to voters. But it does not follow that primaries 
prevent parties from nominating candidates that increase the party's 
chance for success in November. My aim in this paper is to argue that 
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the proliferation of primaries represents no particular threat to the 
capacity of parties to nominate candidates with broad support. For 
although it is true that party leaders can no longer meet and bargain to 
choose candidates directly, it remains within their power to make the rules 
by which candidates are chosen. This power is sufficient to their needs. 
A well-designed system of primaries can, at a minimum, do a better job 
of selecting popular candidates than the current system, and may arguably 
do as well as the much-lauded "mixed" system. 
The reason that primaries can select candidates with broad support is 
that these contests provide an opportunity to measure voters' preferences 
for candidates. In the "mixed" system, party leaders sought to pick the 
most electable candidate available. They accomplished this by guessing 
which candidates voters would be most likely to support in November. 
Presidential primaries, in contrast, can actually test a candidate's 
popularity, and hence his electability. As Nelson Polsby (1960) once 
observed, presidential primaries can serve "as a means by which 
politicians inform themselves about the relative popularity of presidential 
aspirants" (p. 617). 
The problem, however, is that a system of primaries does not 
automatically produce nominees who are capable of doing well in the 
November election. Factional candidates may skillfully parlay narrow but 
intense support into a party nomination, or party regulars, who lack appeal 
to independents, may sweep to victory. Consequently, the rules for 
primaries must be designed in such a way that the candidate who receives 
the most delegates (and hence, presumably the nomination) will be a 
candidate with broad appeal. 
In this paper, I shall propose three sets of changes in the rules governing 
presidential primaries that would bring about this desirable result. First, 
delegates should be allocated in proportion to a candidate's share of the 
vote. Second, the balloting system in primaries should be altered to permit 
voters to express the intensity of their preferences. Finally, it should be 
easier for independents and weak partisans of the opposing party to vote 
in the primary of their choice. By implementing these changes, primaries 
would consistently yield nominees with broad electoral appeal.' 
VOTES AND DELEGATES 
Since primary voters do not directly decide who will be the nominee 
but instead select delegates who actually choose nominees, it is important 
to know how their votes translate into delegates. Different systems of 
I There are other possible rules one might want to address in seeking to improve our 
current system of presidential selection generally, such as New Hampshire's role as the 
nation's first primary. While these other rules are important, I am setting aside such concerns 
and only focusing on whether primaries per se can yield candidates with broad support. 
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allocation affect the number of delegates a candidate receives and hence 
affect how the preferences of voters are registered. If we want the 
allocation of delegates to reflect accurately the popularity of candidates, 
then we want a system that does not skew the results in favor of particular 
candidates by magnifying the size of their victory (or loss). 
There have been four basic allocation systems: proportional 
representation, winner-take-more, winner-take-all, and "loophole." A 
state using proportional representation allocates delegates among 
candidates in proportion to their share of the vote. The winner-take-more 
system, adopted for the Democratic contest in 1984, allocates delegates 
to candidates by congressional district in proportion to their share of the 
vote, but the winner of the district receives a bonus delegate. The winner- 
take-all system gives all the state's delegates to the candidate who receives 
the most votes statewide. A "loophole" primary is winner-take-all by 
congressional district.2 
One way to examine how different allocation systems might affect how 
votes are recorded is to see if different schemes would have changed the 
proportion of delegates a candidate received in past contests.3 Lengle and 
Shafer (1976) argue that in the 1972 race for the presidential nomination 
"the beneficiary of the power hidden in the rules of the game was Senator 
George McGovern. Most primaries offered by (congressional) District and 
Districted primaries maximized McGovern's strength. One simple shift, 
however, to generalized Winner-Take-All laws would have minimized 
that strength, in the process guiding a healthy plurality of delegates (along 
with the nomination?) to Senator Hubert Humphrey. A second change, 
to proportional representation, would have undercut both McGovern and 
Humphrey, leaving only Governor George Wallace to derive electoral 
satisfaction from primary rules" (p. 25).4 This argument assumes that 
under different rules the actions of McGovern (and other candidates) 
would have been the same. Behavior of candidates, however, "cannot be 
expected to be constant under different institutional arrangements" 
(David and Ceasar, 1980, p. 36). If for example, all states were winner- 
take-all, candidates might target resources in those states in which they 
had a chance, while in a system of proportional representation, candidates 
2 This classification does not take account of all the variations in the rules for primaries, 
since individual states often introduce slight differences. For example, the minimum share 
of the vote necessary to qualify for delegates often varies between states. David and Ceasar 
(1980) note that "despite the increased standardization in selection procedure that has taken 
place over the past decade (especially in the Democratic party), each state nomination race 
remains in many respects unique, colored by its own laws, party rules, traditions and political 
culture." Nonetheless, my four categories encompass the major differences. 
3See Lengle and Shafer (1976); Hammond (1980); Gerald Pomper (1979); and David and 
Caesar (1980). 
4Hammond (1980), however, disagrees with Lengle and-Shafer's conclusion. He argues 
they used biased data because they excluded the cases of California and New Mexico. 
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would be more likely to enter all contests, since even a small proportion 
of the vote could yield a few delegates. In what follows, I shall not 
speculate about how the different rules might have changed outcomes; 
instead I shall show how the candidates fared under each system and to 
what degree different rules affect the allocation of delegates and hence 
how voters' preferences were registered. 
Edward Tufte (1973) has suggested a useful way to examine how 
different rules affect the translation of votes into delegates. In studying 
,the relationship between seats and votes in legislative contests, Tufte posits 
a simple linear model: 
Y=A+B1 (X)+E 
where Y is the percentage of seats for a particular party and X is the 
percentage of votes for that party. One can adapt this equation to the issue 
at hand, by making Y the percentage of delegates for a candidate and 
X the percentage of votes for that candidate. This linear equation, so 
modified, yields three politically meaningful numbers which can be 
compared over time, between parties, between candidates and between 
allocation systems. The first is the regression slope or what Tufte calls the 
"swing ratio" or "responsiveness." If the swing ratio is 2, that means for 
every 1% change in the vote there is a 2% change in the proportion of 
delegates awarded a given candidate. The second is the "bias," which 
measures the percentage of votes necessary to receive 50% of the delegates. 
These two numbers provide information on how well the various systems 
translate votes (i.e., preferences) into delegates and the extent to which 
certain candidates were helped or hurt by the rules. The third measure, 
which I shall term the "threshold" (the x-intercept of the regression line), 
shows the percentage of votes necessary to receive any delegates at all. 
The threshold figure is important to candidates such as Jesse Jackson, who 
want, perhaps for bargaining purposes, to stay in the presidential race to 
the convention even though they have no chance of winning the 
nomination themselves. 
While the linear equation provides useful indicators of how well 
preferences are being recorded, a potential problem arises when the 
relationship between the share of delegates and the share of the vote is 
not strictly linear. A small proportion of the vote may yield no delegates, 
while a large proportion of the vote may bring an even bigger proportion 
of delegates than the vote share indicates. Systems other than proportional 
representation provide the winner of the primary more delegates than his 
proportion of the vote indicates.5 If the relationship is not linear, then the 
5This statement is not strictly accurate. Since most proportional systems require that 
candidates receive at least some share of the vote to be eligible for delegates, candidates 
with a small electoral basis often gain no delegates. 
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regression results may yield biased estimates.8 If one plots the proportion 
of delegates by the proportion of votes, however, the relationship for most 
years is quite linear. The Democratic contest in 1972 is the only notable 
exception, so the problem does not appear to be a major one. 
A system of allocation would record votes accurately if candidates were 
awarded delegates in strict proportion to their shares of the primary vote; 
that is, the responsiveness would be 1 with a bias of 50% and a threshold 
of 0%.7 No system in actual use is likely to measure the preferences of voters 
so accurately. As Tufte (1973) argues, "arrangements for translating votes 
into legislative seats almost always work to benefit the party winning the 
largest share of the votes" (p. 540).8 Nevertheless, this ideal outcome 
provides a benchmark by which to judge the different systems and how 
candidates profited from various ways of apportioning delegates. 
Table 1 reports the responsiveness, bias, threshold and linear fit (R- 
squared) of delegate allocation from 1972 to 1984. In 1972 Senator 
McGovern benefited from the rules of the Democratic Party, as Lengle 
and Shafer (1976) suggested. McGovern typically needed only about 31% 
of the vote to receive 50% of the delegates, while Senator Humphrey 
needed about 50% and Governor Wallace about 40% of the vote to secure 
half of the delegates. The slope tells a similar story-McGovern typically 
received 2.3% of the delegates for each 1% increase in votes. Humphrey's 
responsiveness was 1.33, about 40% lower than McGovern's. 
In 1976 the Democratic rules reflected the candidates' share of the vote 
more accurately than in 1972. The slope when using all cases declines from 
1.92 to 1.23, and the bias is 43.1% in 1976 compared with 37.7% in 1972. 
This change is due to the increased number of states using proportional 
representation in 1976. The responsiveness for proportional representation 
is almost 1 to 1, while in loophole contests it is almost 2 to 1. 
The Republican contests in 1976 were relatively unbiased, but the slopes 
were high. The slope is 2 for all cases, and this figure rises to 3.36 when 
one examines only loophole states. While President Ford benefited from 
the rules, he did so to a lesser degree than did McGovern in 1972. The 
6 Tufte (1973) notes this problem and examines two nonlinear fits-the "cube law" and 
a logit model. He concludes that while the logistic fit was "statistically more satisfactory 
than the linear fit . .. its coefficients are not as readily interpretable from a political point 
of view as those of the linear model" (p. 547). I also tried both nonlinear fits for a number 
of years and concluded they were not so useful as the linear model. 
7 Note that the bias and threshold are directly related to each other, since they both are 
a product of the x-intercept. I report them separately because they are useful indicators in 
assessing the allocation rules. 
8 Rae (1967) and Lakeman (1970) concur with Tufte (1973) that the winner's share of 
legislative seats is often exaggerated because of electoral laws, especially the "first past the 
post" system. 
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responsiveness of the system of delegate apportionment slightly favored 
Ford over Governor Reagan. In 1980 Reagan was able to turn the tables 
partially. He had a very favorable bias-33% of the vote gave him 50% of 
the delegates. George Bush, however, had a more favorable translation 
of votes into delegates-1.54 to 1.01. As with the Democrats, the states 
using proportional representation came closer to an accurate reflection 
of the vote. 
The rules for the 1980 Democratic nomination contest produced the 
most accurate system so far: responsiveness was 1.23, bias 45.6%, and 
threshold 4.9%. The reason for these results is that almost all states 
employed a proportional representation system in that year. There was 
also little difference in swing ratio or bias between President Carter and 
Senator Kennedy: Carter's swing ratio was 1.22, while Kennedy's was 1.16, 
while the bias suggests only a slight edge to Carter-44.6% to 46.6%. 
The rules governing the 1984 Democratic nomination contest benefited 
Walter Mondale, as the former vice-president's strategists intended. He 
typically needed about 38% of the vote to receive 50% of the delegates. 
The swing ratio for Mondale was 1.39, a figure similar to that for Senator 
Hart, but larger than that for Jackson (1.2). Jackson also generally needed 
more votes than either of his rivals to receive 50% of the delegates. As in 
other years, the proportional representation system produced the results 
that best reflected the candidates' share of the vote, with the loophole 
systems doing the worst job.9 
During the 1984 pre-nomination campaign, Jesse Jackson complained 
that the system of delegate apportionment treated him unfairly.1o His 
complaints are clearly warranted. Compared with Mondale, Jackson had 
a higher threshold, lower responsiveness, and a less favorable bias. He 
was not, however, the most disadvantaged candidate in recent years; that 
dubious honor goes to Humphrey. 
Allocating delegates in proportion to a candidate's share of the vote is 
clearly the best way for primaries to record the preferences of voters 
accurately." In states that used proportional representation, the fraction 
of the delegates awarded a candidate roughly reflects his or her fraction 
of the vote, while the other rules skew the results. Parties often write the 
rules, however, to favor particular candidates. It is difficult to separate 
the "feelings about changes in the rules from their [the rule makers] policy 
and candidate preferences" (Ranney, 1975, p. 144). The purpose of the 
9 As a side note, while the rules governing the primary contests from 1972 to 1984 
introduced bias into the allocation of delegates, the primary rules appear "fairer" than the 
electoral systems Tufte (1973) examined. 
10 See the New York Times on April 24, May 11, and May 24 of 1984 for articles reporting 
Jackson's complaints. 
11 Rae (1967) and Lakeman (1970) reached similar conclusions when examining how 
election laws affect the votes-to-seat ratio. 
1014 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 48,198 
1984 rules, for example, was to diminish the chances of outsiders and 
enhance the odds favoring Mondale and Kennedy. But if the parties want 
to have a more accurate reading of a candidate's popularity to register 
at the time of the convention, then proportional representation should be 
adopted. 
THE BALLOT 
Some would argue that primaries, regardless of the rules governing the 
allocation of delegates, cannot measure preferences of voters very well. 
John Kellet and Kenneth Mott (1977) argue: "The primaries force a choice 
upon the voters. From an often large field of contenders, we are allowed 
to support only one. In cases where several candidates may espouse similar 
views and attract the same followers, the voters must divide their support 
among them, making it possible for a less popular person to win" (p. 529). 
Nelson Polsby (1983) expands on this assessment: "Second choice 
candidates enjoying widespread approval are unable to get into a game 
in which only first choices are counted. This becomes a problem because 
all first choice candidates of some voters are minimally acceptable to other 
voters-conceivably even to large numbers of voters to whom the party 
wants to appeal in the general election" (p. 165). These criticisms are 
justified. In a large field of candidates, a contender can often win a 
primary with 30 to 40 percent of the vote. Yet 60 to 70 percent of voters 
may not support-or may even greatly dislike-the candidate who wins 
the primary.'2 This criticism, however, questions the desirability of 
allowing only first preferences to be expressed, not the direct primary. 
As Duncan Black (1958) argued, "The effect of the single vote is to 
suppress evidence of all preferences felt by the voter except his first 
preferences for a single candidate" (p. 62). In this section, therefore, I shall 
argue that the preference ballot should replace the current ballot, since 
it offers the best way for primaries to measure accurately the preferences 
of voters for candidates.13 
The preference ballot, or the "alternative vote," allows each voter to 
rank candidates from first to last choice.14 If no candidate wins a majority 
12 Numerous studies document this problem. See Duncan Black (195B), Lakeman (1970), 
Polsby (1983), Dennis Mueller (1979), Brams and Fishburn (1983), and Joslyn (1976). 
13 Of course, a commonly discussed alternative to first preference voting is Approval 
Voting. A number of scholars have supported such a system. See Brams and Fishburn (1983), 
Kellet and Mott (1977), DeMaio and Muzzio (1981), and Joslyn (1976). Approval voting, 
however, does not allow voters to indicate their intensity of preference, only the range of 
their preference. Consequently, this ballot provides less information about voters' 
preferences than preference voting. Moreover, strategic concerns may enter into voters' 
decisions. See Niemi (1984) and Niemi and Bartels (1984) for intelligent discussions of this 
weakness of approval voting. 
14 See Lakeman (1970) for an account of the alternative vote, chapter 3. 
RULES GOVERNING PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES 1015 
of first-place votes, then the candidate finishing last is dropped and his 
or her supporters go to their second preference. The elimination of 
candidates continues until a candidate receives a majority of votes. Under 
this system voters explicitly list their preferences, allowing parties to 
identify the second and third choices of the electorate. Consequently, 
candidates with only a small but intense following would not be able to 
win a primary. Only those candidates with broad support could win- 
an outcome that bodes well for the party in general elections. 
Some argue, however, that preference voting poses problems that make 
it an unattractive alternative. One criticism of preference voting is that 
the plurality winner could be eliminated after a series of vote transfers, 
upsetting that candidate's supporters and making party unity difficult. 
Second, the candidate who is most acceptable may not be chosen, because 
that candidate finished a close last and hence was eliminated (Brams and 
Fishburn, 1983). 
The first criticism is a hybrid of correct and incorrect claims. It is true 
that preference voting could eliminate potential plurality winners-but 
only if the plurality winners had little or no support outside their narrow 
circle of voters. Thus, George McGovern, the plurality winner in 1972, 
probably could not have been nominated in 1972 because many of the 
70 percent of primary voters that did not vote for him that year strongly 
disliked him. But the elimination of plurality winners with narrow bases 
of support would not hamper party unity; it would, in all probability, make 
it easier by ensuring that whoever did win the nomination would have 
broad support within the party. 
Moreover, one must remember that the main purpose of preference 
voting is to secure candidates who are minimally acceptable to the entire 
electorate. That means preventing intense but extreme minorities from 
putting their first choice over on unwilling majorities. Critics who object 
to this feature of the preference ballot are thus claiming, in effect, that 
the feelings of intense minorities are more important than those of 
majorities. Whatever may be said for that position on normative grounds, 
it is not one that is well calculated for coalition-building and winning 
general elections. 
This criticism also incorrectly assumes that plurality winners necessarily 
represent the feelings of intense minorities. In some cases, a plurality 
winner may emerge only because of the particular field of candidates. 
For example, one liberal in a field of a half a dozen moderates is likely 
to emerge as a plurality winner even though any of several moderates 
might have much broader appeal in the party. That preference voting 
would prevent such plurality victories is its strength rather than its 
weakness. 
The second criticism does identify a potential problem for the 
preference system. In a multi-candidate race, the elimination of the 
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candidate with the fewest first-place votes could result in the elimination 
of the candidate with the broadest support. Brams and Fishburn (1983) 
cite the Senate race in New York in 1970 as an example. In that race, James 
Buckley, Richard Ottinger and Charles Goodell sought the Senate seat. 
Under a system of preference voting, Goodell would have been eliminated 
since he finished last in the race. Conceivably, however, he might have 
beaten either Buckley or Ottinger in a two-candidate contest. Such 
situations, however, are not common in primaries. In multi-candidate 
primaries, the last-place finisher is generally a weak candidate with little 
support. In 1984, after the initial contests, Jesse Jackson generally finished 
last. He was a factional candidate with considerably less support than Hart 
and Mondale. In many struggles for the nomination, the number of 
candidates has been quite large-such as in 1972, 1976, and 1984 for the 
Democrats, and in 1980 for the Republicans. But many of these candidates 
who finished last have had only a small following and thus were not 
competitive with the front-runners. Such names as Fred Harris, Reubin 
Askew, and Birch Bayh spring to mind. 
A major advantage of preference voting is that strategic voting is 
discouraged (Lakeman, 1970, p. 71-3). "First preference" voting creates 
incentives for voters to consider the chances of candidates to win as well 
as their true preferences. When explicitly ranking preferences, however, 
voters need not worry about wasting a vote, since their second choice 
counts if their first choice is eliminated. 
Another advantage of preference voting is that it asks voters to think 
in terms they are well accustomed to. Voters can easily rank preferences 
and often do so. When confronted with a series of options, people often 
rank them: "I'd rather visit my parents than go shopping, but I do not 
want to watch television." Since voters have preferences, we should ask 
them, and by so doing obtain better information about their preferences. 
At this point, I have advocated two reforms for presidential primaries- 
allocate delegates to candidates in proportion to their share of the vote 
and adopt a preference ballot. Under these two changes, if one candidate 
receives 50% or more first-place votes, the delegates would be allocated 
proportionally to all contenders. But if no candidate won at least 50% of 
the vote, a likely possibility in early primaries, then the last-place finisher 
would be eliminated and that candidate's supporters would be given to 
their second preference. This process would continue until one candidate 
has 50% of the vote. At that point, delegates would be allocated 
proportionally to the remaining candidates.'5 These reforms would 
prevent candidates with narrow bases of support from winning primaries, 
because a candidate must have at least some degree of support from 50% 
of the electorate to win a primary. And at the same time, the proportional 
representation rule assures that all "serious" candidates win a share of the 
delegates commensurate with their share of the vote. Consequently, the 
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combination of these two rules should allow for an accurate assessment 
of the breadth of a candidate's support-a goal that was central to the 
nomination of candidates in the "mixed" system. 
WHO SHOULD VOTE IN PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES? 
While determining the breadth of support for a candidate is important 
to selecting electable nominees, we must now decide whose support 
should be measured by primaries. This question requires us to decide who 
should be considered "party members." Such decisions, however, are 
often subject to dispute (Berdahl, 1942). Ranney (1975) notes that "just 
about every conflict over making the parties more representative or more 
democratic or more responsive or more effective turns on the basic 
question of who should be treated as party members" (p. 145). Some 
contend that "party members" should be treated synonymously with 
"party workers," not with "party supporters." Schattschneider (1942), for 
example, argued: "Whatever else parties may be, they are not associations 
of voters who support the party candidates. This is to say, the Democratic 
party is not an association of the twenty-seven million people who voted 
for Mr. Roosevelt in November, 1940" (pp. 53-54). The McGovern-Frasier 
Commission (1970), on the other hand, had a much broader definition of 
party membership than Schattschneider. One of the goals of The Mandate 
for Reform was to give "all Democratic voters ... a full, meaningful, and 
timely opportunity to participate" in the selection of party nominees (p. 
9). 
With the increase in the number of presidential primaries, parties have 
become, in effect, who votes in a party's primaries or caucuses. Yet who 
should be allowed to vote in these contests is by no means a simple issue. 
There have been four basic types of rules governing eligibility to vote in 
primaries. One allows any registered voter to participate in a primary- 
the "open" primary. A second allows any registered voter to participate, 
providing the voter declares his or her partisanship at the polling booth. 
In a third kind of primary, registered independents may vote in either 
party's primary, but voters registered with one of the parties are limited 
to their own party's contest (I refer to this type of system as "semi-closed.)" 
The last type is one in which only voters registered as members of a party 
can participate in that party's primary-the so-called "closed" primary.'6 
In recent years the Democratic Party has tried to keep non-Democrats 
out of its nominating process. The McGovern-Frasier Commission argued 
15 The 50% cut-off is not just an arbitrary stipulation. In electoral systems using the 
preference ballot, it is the threshold used for identifying a winner (Lakeman, 1970). 
16 Although this four-way breakdown ignores some differences that exist between states, 
it nonetheless captures the basic options parties and states can use in determining who can 
participate in primaries. 
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that "a full opportunity for all Democrats to participate is diluted if 
members of other parties are allowed to participate in the selection of 
Delegates to the Democratic National Convention" (p. 47). The last two 
Democratic Party commissions on the nomination process banned "the 
use of the 'open primary'-a primary in which voters are not required to 
declare publicly their party preference and to have that preference 
publicly recorded-to select or allocate delegates to the national 
conventions" (Manatt, 1982, pp. 12-13). These commission rules, however, 
still permit registered voters to vote in a primary, provided they "declare 
publicly" their partisanship. 
There has been much speculation that participation in a party's primary 
by the opposition's partisans adversely affects its selection process. There 
has, however, been little empirical investigation of this matter.'7 Using the 
CBS/ New York Times and ABC/ Washington Post exit polls, I 
investigated whether independents and members of the opposition's party 
have different preferences from those of partisans, and how frequently 
crossover voting occurs. 
Table 2 represents preferences of voters for candidates, controlling for 
partisanship. Independents often prefer different candidates from 
partisans. In 1976, Ronald Reagan received the support of a higher 
proportion of independent voters than of Republican voters. Of the nine 
cases for which I have data, only in New Hampshire and California did 
Reagan do worse among independents than among Republicans. At times 
the differences were substantial. In Indiana, the independents and 
Democrats gave Reagan his margin of victory: among Republicans, 
Reagan lost 54.5% to 45.5% to Ford, but independents gave Reagan a 57.3% 
to 42.7% edge over Ford, and Democrats supported Reagan over Ford 
74.6% to 25.4%. When he sought the Republican nomination in 1980, John 
Anderson was more popular among Democrats and independents than 
among members of his own party. Anderson actually won among 
independent voters in Republican primaries in Massachusetts, Wisconsin 
and Illinois, though he did not win any of these contests. 
In Democratic primaries, independents did not differ consistently from 
Democratic identifiers. In New Hampshire in 1976, Morris Udall finished 
first among Democratic identifiers, while among independents and 
Republicans Carter won. In Wisconsin and Michigan Udall won among 
independents, though he lost the primary. In the 1980 Kennedy-Carter 
race, there was no consistent beneficiary of independents' support. In 1980 
Governor Brown did better among independents than Democrats, but this 
performance still could not make him a serious challenger. 
17 Perhaps the earliest study of crossover voting is Overacker (1926). More recent studies 
are Adamany (1976), Hedlund (1978) and Hedlund, Watts and Hedge (1982). 
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TABLE 2 
VOTER'S PREFERENCES BY PARTISANSHIP 
REPUBLICANS INDEPENDENTS DEMOCRATS 
Democrats, 1976 
Carter (n = 10) 40.2% 36.6% 38.5% 
Udall (n =6) 19.4% 29.2% 27.2% 
Jackson (n =5) 23.8% 16.3% 19.0% 
Wallace (n = 7) 19.6% 15.5% 16.5% 
Republicans, 1976 
Ford (n =9) 58.0% 48.8% 49.1% 
Reagan (n =9) 42.0% 51.2% 50.9% 
Democrats, 1980 
Brown (n=5) 8.6% 11.1% 6.3% 
Carter (n 9) 57.2% 44.4% 50.4% 
Kennedy (n = 9) 27.5% 42.0% 44.3% 
Republicans, 1980 
Anderson (n =5) 16.0% 31.5% 41.3% 
Reagan (n=8) 58.7% 43.9% 41.8% 
Bush (n=8) 26.2% 30.3% 27.1% 
Percentages are the average share of the vote each candidate received in the relevant 
primaries. 
Source: CBS/New York Times Poll 
ABC/Washington Post Polls. 
There is little doubt that independents can alter the outcome of primary 
elections. But even in closed primaries, in which only party members are 
supposed to participate, self-identified independents and partisans of the 
opposition party still constitute a sizable segment of the electorate (see 
table 3). Differing requirements for voting do not appear to have a large 
effect on the composition of primary electorates.'8 Among closed 
Democratic primaries 72.6% of the electorate labeled themselves 
Democrats. In semi-closed contests this proportion declines only to 
68.8%.19For pen contests the proportion is 65.1%. The Republican figures 
18 The likely reason that these rules have only a limited effect on the partisan composition 
of the electorate is that they do not act as major barriers to participation. To vote, for instance, 
in a closed primary, all a voter has to do is register with the party. And this act does not 
provide reliable information about true partisanship (Ranney, 1978, p. 221). Thus, while the 
closed primary provides more barriers to participation than these other three rules, it is still 
not enough of a barrier to prevent crossover voting. 
19 There were two surveys in which the partisanship question was not used. Instead a 
question concerning party registration was used. When these cases are eliminated, the 
difference becomes 71.8% to 67.8%, not a major difference. 
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tell a similar story, though in the case of open primaries more non- 
Republican voters participated. The figures are 73.8%, 66.7%, and 51.5% for 
closed, semi-closed, and open, respectively. In the 1980 Wisconsin 
Republican primary, 57.5% of the electorate were either Democrats or 
Independents-the highest proportion of non-partisans among all the 
states. This high proportion of non-Republicans was surely due, in part, 
to Anderson's appeal to independents and Democrats. 
TABLE 3 
THE PARTISAN MAKE-UP OF THE ELECTORATE 
IN PRIMARIES UNDER DIFFERENT RULES 
REPUBLICANS INDEPENDENTS DEMOCRATS 
Democrats 
Open (n =3) 6.3% 28.6% 65.1% 
Closed (n = 6) 4.4% 23.8% 72.6% 
Semi-closed (n = 5) 2.8% 28.4% 68.8% 
Declare Polls (n = 5) 5.0% 25.2% 69.9% 
Republicans 
Open (n =4) 51.5% 36.6% 12.0% 
Closed (n = 4) 73.8% 22.6% 3.6% 
Semi-closed (n = 5) 66.7% 29.6% 3.7% 
Declare Polls (n =4) 69.1% 26.3% 4.6% 
These data are an average of the partisan breakdown in each type of primary in 1976 
and 1980. 
Source: CBS/New York Times Poll 
ABC/Washington Post Polls. 
These are primaries in which voters must declare they are partisans of a party in order 
to vote in that party's primary. 
Even if it were possible to close the nominating process so that only 
partisans could vote, would it be desirable? If one wants primaries to 
nominate highly electable candidates, an argument can be made for 
allowing independents and partisans from the opposition's party to 
participate in primaries. When choosing a candidate in the now-defunct 
mixed system, party leaders typically sought a candidate who could win 
the support not only from their partisans, but also from independents and 
weak partisans of the other party. V.0. Key (1964) contended that "each 
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party leadership must maintain the loyalty of its own standpatters; it must 
also concern itself with the great block of voters uncommitted to either 
party as well as those who may be weaned away from the opposition." 
Eisenhower's nomination in 1952 can be largely attributed to the belief 
of many Republican delegates that he could attract independent and 
Democratic support that Taft could not. Since now neither party 
constitutes a majority of the electorate, winning the general election 
requires a candidate to gain votes from citizens who do not identify with 
that party. Certainly the Republican success in recent presidential 
elections can be attributed to that party's ability to attract independents 
and defectors from the Democratic party. 
So if parties want to nominate electable candidates and they use 
primaries to choose electable nominees, there are good reasons for making 
certain that the candidates they select are attractive to independents and 
opposition party voters. It is unlikely that independents would "raid" a 
party's primary to vote for their least favorite candidate to undermine that 
party's chances in the general election. A more likely reason for 
independents (or even partisans of the other party) to vote in a partisan 
primary is that they found a candidate they would be willing to support 
in November. Certainly the support Anderson and Wallace received from 
outside their own party is consistent with this argument. Overacker (1926) 
came to a similar conclusion in her study of presidential primaries: "A 
careful study of the cases where the members of one party have 
participated in the primary of the other party . .. lends no color to the 
claim of the opponents of the 'open' primary that voters go into the 
opposing party to throw their vote to the weakest candidates, or the 
candidates whom they think will be the most easily beaten in the election. 
In every case they have been motivated by a genuine interest in, and 
support of, the candidate for whom they voted" (p. 98). 
In short, political parties should not worry about trying to limit 
participation only to partisans. It is in the interest of parties to encourage 
independents and potential defectors from the other party to participate 
in its primary, since knowing the preferences of these "swing" voters is 
useful when trying to select a nominee who has broad support. Thus, the 
last change in the rules I am advocating is to have the state parties adopt 
either an "open" primary or "declare at polls" primary.20 
20 One might argue, given the evidence in table 3, that changing the rules would have 
little influence on the partisan composition of primary electorates. While it is true that it 
may not always make a large difference, there is at least the potential for all registered voters 
to participate in a primary if they happened to be motivated by a particular candidate. 
Consequently, if a candidate has a great deal of support outside of the party, there would 
be an opportunity for it to be expressed. 
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CONCLUSION 
As we have seen, the current primary system does not provide good 
information about a candidate's potential popularity for the general 
election. If the parties want to nominate candidates with broad support, 
then they should allow independents and weak partisans of the opposing 
party to participate in primaries, use a proportional representation scheme 
to allocate delegates, and adopt a preference ballot. Adopting such 
reforms, however, is not without potential drawbacks, because knowing 
voters' preferences may not automatically lead to nominating candidates 
who are capable of winning in November. For instance, these rules may 
foster hard fought multi-candidate campaigns, which could divide the 
party so seriously that the fall election would be nearly impossible to win.21 
Thus, while the parties may be getting a better indicator of a candidate's 
popularity, these reforms could have exactly the opposite effect from the 
one intended. There is a growing literature assessing whether divisive 
primaries hinder a party's chance for victory in the general election (see 
Pierson and Smith, 1975; Bernstein, 1977; Lengle, 1980; Born, 1981; Kenney 
and Rice, 1984, 1985; and Westlye, 1985). 
While divisiveness is a real concern, it should not serve as a major 
obstacle to nominating highly electable candidates through my 
"reformed" primary system. First, the literature on the effect of divisive 
primaries on general election results is mixed (Kenney and Rice, 1984, p. 
905). And in those studies that have found divisiveness to be detrimental 
to the party's chances in the fall election, the effect has been small (Born, 
1981; Kenney and Rice, 1985). The reason for these small, and often 
conflicting, results may be simply that strong candidates do not face stiff 
nomination struggles because potential rivals, seeing the popularity of 
their opponent, decide against running, while weak candidates often have 
divisive primaries and lose in November, because their vulnerability 
invites challenges from within their party. Thus, divisiveness per se may 
have little, if any, impact beyond the effect of the prior strength of the 
candidates (Born, 1981; and Westlye, 1985). 
21 There are, of course, other problems that might arise from my rules. Allowing 
independents and opposing partisans to participate, for example, may be seen by loyal 
partisans as undercutting the values of the party. If disillusioned, the "core" party supporters 
might be less willing to work for the party and contribute money to its campaign treasury. 
But I suspect that core partisans would not react in such a way. If the nominee has a good 
chance of being electable, these core supporters might be more willing to help the nominee, 
since one generally prefers to back a winner. 
Another problem is that a preference ballot could confuse voters (especially the poorly 
educated ones) and lessen turnout in the short run, leading potentially to primary electorates 
that are highly unrepresentative of the rank and file selecting the nominee. This concern 
is reasonable and efforts would have to be made to educate the public about this change. 
These potential problems are not, however, as important as the possible effects of 
divisiveness, since it has direct implications for nominating electable candidates. 
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Second, there is little reason to think my specific reforms would 
exacerbate the problem of divisiveness in presidential primaries. The 
proportional representation rule, for example, could keep contenders in 
the race longer than a system that favors the winner of a primary, which 
could be harmful to party unity by dragging out the length of the struggle. 
Yet, with the possible exception of Jesse Jackson, candidates, if anything, 
tend to drop out of the race too quickly. The winnowing process, rather 
than the rules allocating delegates, is largely responsible for cutting down 
the number of active candidates. Moreover, the divisiveness that does exist 
in presidential primaries is probably more due to the long primary season 
and the numerous opportunities for the candidates to exchange barbs than 
the rule I am advocating. In recent years there have been a number of 
hard-fought campaigns, such as the ones between Reagan and Ford in 
1976, Kennedy and Carter in 1980, and Hart and Mondale in 1984. It seems 
unlikely that my rules would have increased the bitterness that existed 
between these rivals. 
The chances of divisiveness may actually be somewhat reduced under 
my proposed arrangement. The reformed primary system would allocate 
delegates in proportion to the candidate's share of the vote while using 
a preference ballot. This combination of rules may help reduce the 
possibility of hard-fought, multi-candidate primaries. First, and perhaps 
most important, my rules would prevent candidates who have narrow 
bases of support from winning primaries, because a candidate must have 
at least some support among 50% of the electorate. Without the resulting 
media attention and extra delegates accorded a winner, such candidates 
may be less willing (and less able) to carry out a protracted battle for the 
nomination. Second, my proposed system would provide few, if any, 
delegates to the distant finishers, because when no candidate receives 50% 
of the vote the preference ballot eliminates the candidate with the fewest 
votes. Thus, the rules may encourage candidates with little support to 
withdraw (and may even discourage these type of candidates from 
undertaking their long-shot campaigns), since they would be securing so 
few delegates. The remaining candidates may be locked in a competitive 
and possibly divisive struggle, but no more so than have been recent 
contenders for the nomination. Finally, since these rules attempt to reflect 
each candidate's popularity and are not designed to favor specific 
candidates,22 there may be fewer battles over the rules, as we saw in the 
1984 Democratic nomination. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, primaries can offer political parties 
the opportunity to nominate candidates with broad support, providing 
the rules governing them are designed to reflect more faithfully the 
22 While, of course, certain kinds of candidates will be helped under my system, the rules 
were not written explicitly to favor a specific candidate, as has been the case in recent years. 
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preferences-including second preferences-of both regular party voters 
and potential party supporters. Party leaders in the "mixed system" did 
use primaries as indicators of a candidate's electability. John Kennedy's 
victory over Hubert Humphrey in the 1960 West Virginia primary is 
probably the most famous case in which the results of a primary were 
taken as an indication of a candidate's electability. The irony is that with 
the proliferation of primaries, party leaders have not seized on the 
opportunity to use primaries in the manner I have advocated. 
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